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Preface & Acknowledgements 
Welcome to our Tenth Annual Acquisition Research Symposium! We regret that this 
year it will be a “paper only” event. The double whammy of sequestration and a continuing 
resolution, with the attendant restrictions on travel and conferences, created too much 
uncertainty to properly stage the event. We will miss the dialogue with our acquisition 
colleagues and the opportunity for all our researchers to present their work. However, we 
intend to simulate the symposium as best we can, and these Proceedings present an 
opportunity for the papers to be published just as if they had been delivered. In any case, we 
will have a rich store of papers to draw from for next year’s event scheduled for May 14–15, 
2014! 
Despite these temporary setbacks, our Acquisition Research Program (ARP) here at 
the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) continues at a normal pace. Since the ARP’s 
founding in 2003, over 1,200 original research reports have been added to the acquisition 
body of knowledge. We continue to add to that library, located online at 
www.acquisitionresearch.net, at a rate of roughly 140 reports per year. This activity has 
engaged researchers at over 70 universities and other institutions, greatly enhancing the 
diversity of thought brought to bear on the business activities of the DoD.  
We generate this level of activity in three ways. First, we solicit research topics from 
academia and other institutions through an annual Broad Agency Announcement, 
sponsored by the USD(AT&L). Second, we issue an annual internal call for proposals to 
seek NPS faculty research supporting the interests of our program sponsors. Finally, we 
serve as a “broker” to market specific research topics identified by our sponsors to NPS 
graduate students. This three-pronged approach provides for a rich and broad diversity of 
scholarly rigor mixed with a good blend of practitioner experience in the field of acquisition. 
We are grateful to those of you who have contributed to our research program in the past 
and encourage your future participation. 
Unfortunately, what will be missing this year is the active participation and 
networking that has been the hallmark of previous symposia. By purposely limiting 
attendance to 350 people, we encourage just that. This forum remains unique in its effort to 
bring scholars and practitioners together around acquisition research that is both relevant in 
application and rigorous in method. It provides the opportunity to interact with many top DoD 
acquisition officials and acquisition researchers. We encourage dialogue both in the formal 
panel sessions and in the many opportunities we make available at meals, breaks, and the 
day-ending socials. Many of our researchers use these occasions to establish new teaming 
arrangements for future research work. Despite the fact that we will not be gathered 
together to reap the above-listed benefits, the ARP will endeavor to stimulate this dialogue 
through various means throughout the year as we interact with our researchers and DoD 
officials.  
Affordability remains a major focus in the DoD acquisition world and will no doubt get 
even more attention as the sequestration outcomes unfold. It is a central tenet of the DoD’s 
Better Buying Power initiatives, which continue to evolve as the DoD finds which of them 
work and which do not. This suggests that research with a focus on affordability will be of 
great interest to the DoD leadership in the year to come. Whether you’re a practitioner or 
scholar, we invite you to participate in that research. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the ARP:  
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Abstract 
This report presents the results of research and analyses on current and future operational 
capability gap development and acquisition practices in the United States Navy and the 
Combatant Commands (COCOMs), as exemplified by Pacific Command (PACOM). 
Leveraging key stakeholder interviews and using a systems thinking framework known as the 
Conceptagon (Boardman & Sauser, 2008), we investigated and assessed the Navy’s Future 
Naval Capabilities (FNC) process as well as the Joint Staff (JS) Capability Gap Assessment 
(CGA) process as it applies to the annual submission of PACOM’s Integrated Priority List 
(IPL) of capability needs. The study approached both processes as systems and identified 
and explored their critical systemic attributes such as parts, relationships, boundaries, 
governance mechanisms/structures, key processes, transformations, stakeholders, and 
missions, to name a few. Based on this assessment, we conducted a structured and 
systematic comparison of the two processes to identify good practices and favorable 
dynamics that are likely to reinforce the desired outcome, which—for our purposes—is 
defined as the resolution of capability gaps and, ultimately, deployment of needed capabilities 
to the warfighters. In light of this analysis, we present key insights, explore some problem 
areas, and discuss possible improvements to the said processes. 
Summary of Results 
The following bulleted list presents the study team’s conclusions and key insights, and it 
is followed by a list of key preliminary considerations for improvement strategies. 
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Key Insights Into Effective Practices of the FNC Program 
 Participatory and binding measures (as exemplified by FNC roundtable and 
technology transition agreements) create a sense of collective process 
ownership amongst stakeholders who may otherwise have differing interests.  
This increases the chance of solution resourcing and development. 
 Communicating intended outputs and outcomes relative to the gap development 
process (as done by FNC in road shows and associated briefing materials)  helps 
to manage stakeholder expectations and inform stakeholder perceptions of 
success, culminating in improved stakeholder commitment and acceptance of 
gap development processes and associated fulfillment activities. 
 FNC identification and tracking of gap fulfillment measures (e.g., transition 
statistics) allows the FNC program to adjust in order to improve performance. 
 FNC integration of processes that represent the entire lifecycle of a gap (from 
gap identification through capability deployment to the warfighter) promotes a 
seamless transition between different phases of the effort, facilitates flow of 
required information, and provides for continuity of efforts. 
How FNC Practices Could Improve the JS CGA/PACOM IPL Process 
 The JS CGA/PACOM IPL process could expand its boundary to include solution 
providers. Existing structures (e.g., Functional Capability Boards [FCBs], 
supporting working groups) could be used to facilitate formal participation by the 
acquisition community.   
 COCOM organizations could receive feedback on JS disposition of gap 
information. Formal, accountable, ongoing and two-way communication would 
facilitate understanding, expectation management, and feedback. The JS could 
establish formal communication mechanisms to provide updates on gap 
modifications (i.e., merging similar gaps, capability board adjustments) and 
outcomes.   
 Gap and solution progress statistics, collected in coordination with the acquisition 
and warfighter communities (currently partially tracked by the JS and accessible 
through Knowledge Management and Decision Support [KMDS]), could be 
documented and published periodically (e.g., annually or bi-annually) and could 
be actively disseminated to COCOMs and briefed at FCBs and Joint Capability 
Boards (JCBs).  
 These outcome-tracking metrics could be used by both JS and COCOM staffs to 
inform process improvement efforts. The JS process could establish procedures 
and update instructions and guidance documents to better define roles and 
responsibilities with metric and process accountability.   
Introduction 
The Department of Defense’s (DoD) annual Integrated Priority List (IPL) process1 is 
an integral part of the Joint Staff’s (JS) Capability Gap Assessment (CGA) process,2 which, 
once published, is one input among many considered by defense acquisition communities. 
This process, however, may result in a high-priority IPL capability gap(s) receiving lower 
priority consideration in the military departments’ resource allocation and acquisition 
decisions. By contrast, the Navy’s Future Naval Capabilities (FNC) process is considered by 
both naval and non-naval audiences to be a remarkably responsive and integrated process 
                                                
1 The IPL process is intended to address the nine Combatant Commands’ Joint warfighting needs 
through identification and prioritization of operational capability gaps. 
2 Results of the CGA process are published through a Joint Requirements Oversight Council 
Memorandum (JROCM).   
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that supports naval warfighter needs. This is further substantiated by the FNC process 
transition statistics, which demonstrate a record of successfully addressing naval capability 
gaps through the allocation of resources and establishment of effective schedules for 
research, development, and acquisition of needed capabilities (Office of Naval Research, 
2012). 
In this paper, we present a comparative assessment of the Navy’s FNC process and 
the JS CGA/COCOM IPL process as exemplified in the PACOM IPL process. This study 
acknowledges FNC is an end-to-end process inclusive of solution development and 
transition, whereas the JS CGA/COCOM IPL process focuses solely on gap identification 
and assessment with little integration of solution activities. Although this comparison may 
first appear asymmetric, we compared the processes across similar steps that culminate in 
the shared milestone of establishing final, prioritized gaps (see Figure 1). Throughout the 
course of the study, however, it was frequently noted that integrated solution development 
activities significantly influenced FNC’s gap development activities.  As will be explained in 
our conclusions, in FNC, the interaction and mutual feedback between these steps 
maximizes the process’ overall responsiveness to naval warfighters’ needs. 
 
 Common Milestones of FNC and JS CGA/IPL 
Methodology 
A Systems Thinking Approach to Data Compilation & Comparison 
The team chose to approach data analysis using a systems thinking approach, which 
is particularly useful when assessing soft systems, such as enterprises and processes.  In 
this study, the FNC process and the JS CGA/PACOM IPL development process were  
viewed as systems, each with constituent parts, united by relationships, working together to 
achieve a specific purpose.  
In particular, the team used the soft systems framework, the Conceptagon 
(Boardman & Sauser, 2008), to assess the FNC process and the JS CGA/ PACOM IPL 
process. The Conceptagon served as a consistent framework for comparison, standardizing 
the team’s approach to characterizations. It allowed the team to compare seemingly 
disparate processes across set dimensions of interest. For example, instead of trying to 
compare the Joint Staff J-8 with the FNC IPT (a difficult comparison at its face value), the 
team compared across more abstract dimensions such as “actors” and “relationships.” Such 
dimensions of comparison were used throughout the study to facilitate a consistent and 
coherent approach to identifying the underlying similarities and differences between the two 
processes.  
Data Collection 
Data and relevant information for this study were collected through literature review 
and interviews. To prepare for assessment of FNC, study team members attended the 
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Office of Naval Research’s FNC external training (Office of Naval Research, 2012). This 
half-day course provided instruction on FNC program basics (FNC goals, objectives, and 
participants) and key program management processes. In addition to the half-day course, 
the team conducted interviews with the FNC Program Director (Steve Smolinski) and 
members of the director’s staff. The team also reviewed Integrated Process Team (IPT) 
charters, FNC briefings, FNC policy memorandums, and related naval instructions. To 
prepare for assessment of PACOM’s IPL, and its movement through the broader Joint Staff 
CGA process, the team reviewed PACOM documents such as Plans to Resources to 
Outcomes Process (PROP) briefings. The team also conducted interviews with participants 
in the PACOM IPL process such as the PACOM science advisor and PROP and future 
capabilities subject-matter experts. To understand what happens once IPL entries are 
submitted to the Joint Staff, the team interviewed members of the Joint Staff J-8, Joint 
Capability Office. The team also reviewed a number of applicable Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Instructions (CJCSIs). For general awareness, cleared members of the team 
reviewed additional information, including actual IPL entries. 
Research Questions and Study Scope Adjustments 
This study’s original research question sought to address whether the acquisition 
process is responsive to COCOM needs by comparing a very responsive system (the 
Navy’s FNC) to the existing JS/COCOM system, using PACOM as an example. To answer 
this question, the team needed to explore four major research areas: (1) how COCOM 
needs are identified (collection of warfighter statements of operational shortfalls), (2) how 
operational shortfalls are captured and communicated (development of the COCOM IPL), 
(3) how IPL statements are transformed into Joint Capability Gap statements (development 
of the Joint Capability Gap Assessment), and (4) how Joint Capability Gaps are resolved 
(Service efforts to fund and develop solutions). While the fourth research area may hold 
specific statistics that seemingly answer the question, these statistics are subject to great 
error if the gaps to which the Services are responding, do not accurately reflect COCOM 
needs. We realized that answering the question was not just a matter of gathering statistics 
on Service development programs, but also of exploring the gap development process that 
informs gap resolution efforts. Therefore, we focused on the gap development processes 
(Areas 1–3) rather than Service solution funding and development (Area 4), which would 
have been a study in its own right.  
In addition to focusing on the gap development process, the study determined 
focusing on a single COCOM would yield a more detailed analysis. The decision to examine 
PACOM was made for several reasons: (1) PACOM had a mature gap identification 
process; (2) PACOM’s process is well documented and the team had access to PACOM 
briefings, instructions, and materials; and (3) the team had personal contacts in the PACOM 
IPL development process who agreed to participate in interviews.  
Limitations of the Study 
Due to the decision to focus on a single COCOM, the resulting recommendations 
may be less applicable to some COCOMs. Also, information used throughout the study was 
based on access to available documentation and the professional views/perceptions of the 
individuals interviewed; as a result, some of the information is subject to personal bias and 
limited to the experience of those interviewed. Finally, to remain unclassified, specific IPL 
information is not discussed. 
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Overview of the FNC and Joint Staff CGA/IPL Systems 
The following section presents a high-level overview of both FNC and the JS 
CGA/PACOM IPL processes and provides grounds for understanding the subsequent 
Conceptagon assessment. 
Future Naval Capabilities 
Initiated in 2002 (Office of Naval Research, n.d.-b), the FNC program and the 
associated process addresses naval gaps with science and technology (S&T) solutions on 
an annual basis (Office of Naval Research, 2012). Using 6.2 (i.e., applied research) and 6.3 
(i.e., advanced technology development) funding, this program “develop[s] … quantifiable 
technology products in response to validated S&T gaps” within a five-year time frame (Office 
of Naval Research, 2012). Upon maturation of technology and fulfillment of exit criteria 
(Office of Naval Research, 2012), the FNC program transitions related products to naval 
acquisition programs of record “for timely incorporation into platforms, weapons, sensors, 
and process improvements” (U.S. Naval Research Laboratory, n.d.).3  The FNC process is 
currently organized along “9 pillars of Enabling Capabilities (ECs)” (Office of Naval 
Research, 2012), each of which “is an aggregate of science and technology that is aligned 
to an identified warfighting gap or warfighting capability, and it can deliver a distinct, 
measurable improvement that contributes to closing the corresponding warfighting gap” 
(Office of Naval Research, n.d.-a).4   
The FNC program is managed through a collaborative process.  Broadly speaking,5 
OPNAV/HQMC requirements are assessed to identify gaps with S&T solutions. These gaps 
are then assigned to related pillars for identification of potential solutions. Integrated Product 
Teams (IPTs) forward prioritized ECs. These ECs are reviewed, assessed, and approved by 
the Technical Oversight Group (TOG), a three-star Navy and Marine Corps Board of 
Directors. Related products begin the development phase with strict conditions for an 
eventual transition to the warfighter as agreed amongst representatives from 
requirements/resource communities, science and technology developers, and the 
acquisition community. The overall program is administered by the Office of Naval Research 
(ONR). 
The DoD Joint Staff Capability Gap Assessment/Integrated Priority List Process and 
Its Employment by Pacific Command 
The annual CGA/IPL process produces a prioritized list of DoD warfighting capability 
gaps that impact DoD Combatant Commands’ (COCOMs) execution of operational, 
contingency, and campaign plans.  This process informs the JS CGA, Functional Capability 
Board (FCB) planning guidance, and development of the Chairman’s Program Assessment 
(CPA), and analyzes baseline resource allocation priorities for the subsequent years’ IPLs 
(K. Carlan, personal communication, April 11, 2012; D. Glenister, personal communication, 
April 16, 2012).  
                                                
3 The FNC program deals only with products whose technology readiness levels (TRL) are between 
three and six (Office of Naval Research, 2012). 
4 As explained in the FNC external training (ONR, 2012), EC pillars include sea shield, sea strike, sea 
basing, FORCEnet, naval expeditionary maneuver warfare, capable manpower, force health 
protection, enterprise and platform enablers, and power & energy. 
5 The discussion of the FNC process relies on information gathered during FNC Training attended at 
the ONR on March 9, 2012, and the PowerPoint slides (ONR, 2012) disseminated during the training. 
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Each COCOM has a different process for generating input into the DoD Joint Staff 
CGA/IPL6 process. PACOM’s employment of the JS CGA/IPL process is comprised of four 
fundamental activities, including development, submission, assessment, and validation of 
capability gaps (K. Carlan, personal communication, April 11, 2012; Carlan, 2011).7  First, 
the process begins with the identification, organization, and development by PACOM 
components and sub-Unified Command organizations of capability gaps through a 
collaboratively facilitated Plans to Resources to Outcomes Process (PROP) within the 
PACOM J-8 Resources and Assessment Directorate. USF-J, USFK, USARPAC, PACFLT, 
MARFORPAC, PACAF, SOCPAC, JIATF-West, JPAC, and ALCOM are the participating 
PACOM PROP organizations. The PROP results, used for a number of PACOM purposes, 
including as an input to the IPL, are reviewed and revised by key O-6 level staff officers, J-
code Directors, and the PACOM Deputy Commander. Second, the PACOM Commander 
then prioritizes, approves, and submits the PACOM IPL to the Joint Staff in support of the 
JS J-8 Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate CGA process, and 
informally to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics; 
USD[AT&L]).  Third, JS J-8 conducts a CGA of all nine COCOM IPLs including PACOM (K. 
Duffy & D. Glenister, personal communication, April 16, 2012).8  The assessment process 
includes review and analysis of IPL capability gaps by nine FCBs, which determine 
warfighting relevance and result in recommended capability solutions and funding.  This 
process produces and submits a J-8-recommended prioritized list of capability gaps and 
associated solutions to the Joint Capability Board (JCB).  The JCB reviews and 
recommends the capability gap list to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC).  
Fourth, the JROC validates capability gaps, and publishes a JROC Memorandum (JROCM) 
CGA, which is distributed to the USD(AT&L) and Services for action on capability solutions 
acquisition and fielding. 
The Conceptagon Assessment 
The Conceptagon framework (Boardman & Sauser, 2008) aids analysts in 
conceptualizing and characterizing a system.  The framework defines a system’s attributes 
in seven easy-to-remember sets (triplets). This analysis used the Conceptagon triplets. Our 
understanding of these triplets is explained in the following list: 
 Interior, exterior, boundary—This triplet describes the perimeter that 
separates entities that comprise the system, from entities outside the 
system’s control. 
 Wholes, parts, relationships—This triplet requires identification of the system 
at hand, the constituent pieces, and the relationships that bind those pieces 
together. 
 Structure, function, process—This triplet identifies the key composition, 
arrangement, or organization (structures) a system employs to support key 
activities (processes) necessary to produce the desired system behavior 
(function).  
                                                
6 In some cases, the study team refers to the JS CGA/IPL process as opposed to the JS 
CGA/PACOM IPL process. This change in nomenclature is intended to capture instances wherein 
discussion points are likely relevant to multiple COCOMs. 
7 All discussion on PACOM IPL activities, including PROP, is based on personal interviews with Kit 
Carlan and Ken Bruner of PACOM, and PowerPoint slides dated March 23, 2011, and prepared by 
Kit Carlan.  
8 The information about JS CGA process and details is based on interviews with Air Force Col Keith 
Duffy of JS and Navy CAPT Dave Glenister of JS. 
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 Inputs, outputs, transformations—This triplet identifies items coming into the 
system (inputs) and items exiting the system (outputs) as products or 
deliverables. The triplet also identifies the change (i.e., transformation) that 
converts inputs to outputs. 
 Command, control, communication—This triplet explores the system’s 
governance structures and control mechanism, and takes into account 
communication feedbacks and stovepipes. 
 Openness, hierarchy, emergence—This triplet investigates a system’s ability 
to accept inputs from the exterior environment and to absorb and 
accommodate new components (openness), to reconfigure itself in light of 
new requirements (hierarchy), and to respond  to and manage unexpected 
behaviors produced by such changes (emergence). 
 Variety, harmony, parsimony—This triplet refers to the system’s design 
balance, assessing if the system has “too much” or “too little” of anything.  
Triplet 1: Interior, Exterior Boundary 
Navy’s FNC Process 
There are three pertinent FNC boundaries: program specification, temporal, and 
stakeholder. The first boundary is established in reference to program specifications, which 
provide that the FNC system works only with 6.2 and 6.3 funding and is only authorized to 
handle naval gaps with S&T solutions of Technology Readiness Level (TRL) 3 to 6 (Office of 
Naval Research, 2012). The second boundary defines what is within and beyond the system 
from a temporal angle as portrayed by Figure 2. Accordingly, operational requirements 
definition takes place prior to the FNC process. As explained in the FNC training provided 
on March 9, 2012, the process starts with development of S&T gaps by the Chief of Naval 
Operations and Headquarters, Marine Corps staff and continues as follows:  ONR responds 
to the gaps by proposing ECs, an aggregate of one or more technology products aimed at 
closing or mitigating these gaps (S. Smolinksi, personal communication, November 29, 
2012). Transition of matured S&T products into the acquisition POR is also within the 
bounds of the FNC program. Integration to the acquisition POR, however, happens 
subsequent to the FNC process (Office of Naval Research, 2012). Finally, the third 
boundary defines stakeholders who have influence on the FNC system. For example, those 
stakeholders that actively take part within the FNC process involve IPTs, the TOG, TOG 
working groups (WGs), resource sponsors, acquisition sponsors, and S&T developers. 
Some of the passive FNC stakeholders include OPNAV, FCC/MCCDC, naval warfighters, 
COCOMs, and industry. 
 
 FNC Temporal Boundaries 
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The FNC boundaries can be characterized as semi-porous, presenting degrees of 
openness across elements, actors, and issues. Acquisition sponsors, resource sponsors, 
and S&T developers leverage system flexibility to reach out to and bring in actors from the 
external environment. This is not to say that the FNC boundaries allow for complete 
permeability. The program specifications are clear and firm (e.g., non S&T gaps are outside 
the authorization, budget has a clear mandate) and set structures with clear membership 
descriptions indicate that membership is not ad hoc and does not change over time. The 
FNC process has well-defined boundaries. 
Joint Staff CGA /PACOM IPL Process 
When we consider what is within and beyond the JS CGA/ PACOM IPL process, two 
boundaries appear particularly relevant: conceptual/temporal and stakeholder. According to 
the conceptual/temporal boundaries (Figure 3), PACOM warfighters provide requirements 
into the PROP process, which generates PACOM capability gaps/shortfalls for the PACOM 
Deputy Commander’s review and assessment (K. Carlan, personal communication, 
December 10, 2012). The PACOM Commander approves and submits the final PACOM IPL 
to the JS CGA process. After going through several steps within this process, a JROCM is 
issued and conveyed to the COCOMs, Services, and OSD offices. The second boundary 
applicable to the PACOM IPL process is the stakeholder boundary. Active stakeholders 
include the PACOM Commander, PACOM components and J-code Directors, JS Functional 
Capability Board, JS Joint Capability Board, JROC, and JS J-8 (K. Carlan, personal 
communication, April 11, 2012;  D. Glenister, personal communication, April 16, 2012).  
Some of the passive stakeholders include other COCOMs, Services, defense agencies, 
combat support agencies, and inter-agencies. It is important to note that the majority of the 
Joint Staff CGA/ PACOM IPL process stakeholders interact with but are not necessarily 
controlled by PACOM. 
 
 PACOM IPL Process Conceptual/Temporal Boundaries 
The JS CGA/PACOM IPL process is characterized by mixed boundaries. The 
boundary between the PROP process and JS-led CGA process is semi-porous: Although 
interaction between the PROP and the PACOM Commander is two-way, there are no 
formally mandated feedbacks subsequent to PACOM’s IPL submission (D. Glenister, 
personal communication, November 26, 2012). PACOM does not control the JS-led CGA 
process. The outer boundaries of the JS CGA/PACOM IPL process present different levels 
of openness. At the entry point, the boundary is soft and semi-porous, allowing interaction 
between the PACOM warfighter and the PROP (K.  Carlan, personal communication, April 
11, 2012; December 10, 2012). At the exit point, where the JROCM is completed and 
distributed to COCOMs, Services, and OSD offices, the boundary is hard with no two-way 
interaction. 
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Comparative Assessment 
A comparison of programmatic boundaries indicates that while the FNC process has 
clear programmatic boundaries with specific funding lines and approved types of actionable 
gaps (e.g., naval S&T gaps with solutions at set TRLs); the JS CGA/IPL process does not 
have an associated type of funding approved/authorized and is expected to address any 
gap that is deemed significant. Similarly, comparison of the temporal boundary reveals that 
even though both processes have a three-phase lifecycle (pre, during, and post; see Figures 
2 and 3), they differ in system goals. Unlike the FNC system, which is designed to deal with 
the full gap-to-solution lifecycle, the JS CGA/PACOM IPL process is designed to deal with 
only capability gaps. Finally, stakeholder boundaries show that the FNC process has a more 
comprehensive approach to stakeholder participation in line with its full lifecycle process. 
Unlike the JS CGA/PACOM IPL process, the FNC process includes not only operators but 
also resourcers and developers. In addition, all FNC stakeholders are bound by both 
organization (i.e., single naval command) and process, which ensures a unified 
organizational vision and direct accountability. The JS CGA/PACOM IPL process, on the 
other hand, predominately involves representatives from the operational communities (with 
limited input from the acquisition community) who are bound by process. These 
stakeholders—controlled by multiple command authority—have competing visions and 
distributed accountability. The nature of the boundaries also impacts the quality of 
stakeholder communications. Even though both processes have semi-porous boundaries, 
FNC relies on a collaborative information exchange (i.e., two-way communications) while the 
JS CGA/PACOM IPL process involves predominantly one-way information delivery.  
Key Insights 
Consequences resulting from differences in system boundaries of these two 
processes include the following: 
 The FNC process is designed to maximize gap resolution through dedicated 
programs. 
 The JS CGA/IPL system defines gaps but is not equipped to buy, develop, 
and produce solutions. 
 Unified command structure allows the FNC system to centralize control while 
the JS CGA/PACOM IPL process has distributed and decentralized control. 
 Broad program definition (all gaps by all COCOMs) introduces complexity into 
the JS CGA/PACOM IPL process. 
 Collaborative communication enhances shared understanding and 
expectations amongst FNC stakeholders. 
Triplet 2: Wholes, Parts, Relationships 
Navy’s FNC Process 
The FNC system is comprised of its mission, stakeholders, processes, S&T gaps, 
the S&T budget, S&T products, FNC pillars, Enabling Capability (EC) proposals, and ECs. 
When these parts and their relationships come together, they form a coherent and 
meaningful whole—the FNC system. For example, ECs are made up of S&T products, 
which respond to S&T gaps. Similarly, ECs are organized along the nine FNC pillars. 
Analysis of this triplet shows that the FNC process constitutes a well-organized 
system. Stakeholders have a clear understanding of the parts and the overall system 
mission. Moreover, the relationships between stakeholders are facilitated by codification of 
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roles and responsibilities. The parts are also knit together with effective flow of information, 
resources, and activities. As such, they are configured to form a well-connected whole. 
Joint Staff CGA/PACOM IPL Process 
The IPL system as a whole is made up of stakeholders, processes, PACOM 
operational shortfalls, PACOM IPL of capability gaps, and Joint capability gaps. As an 
example, PACOM components identify and prioritize PACOM operational capability gaps, 
which are the basis for the PACOM IPL. PACOM IPL capability gaps are then evaluated for 
and may be incorporated into joint capability gaps.  
A key observation from this triplet is that PACOM’s IPL development process is 
dependent on, but does not control, all parts participating in the process. This is significant 
for two reasons: (1) JS, which does not participate in PACOM’s IPL development process, 
controls the second part of the JS CGA/PACOM IPL process; and (2) Joint capability gap 
descriptions are affected by other COCOM capability gaps. Analysis of this triplet also sheds 
light on the flow of information within PACOM’s IPL process. While PROP relationships 
benefit from a collaborative environment, PACOM’s PROP to JS relationship is 
characterized largely through one-way interactions. Additionally, there is limited reporting or 
feedback on the status of solutions to PACOM’s capability gaps; in addition, access to JS 
tracked information requires that COCOMs pull for information, rather than receive it by way 
of JS push mechanisms (D. Glenister, personal communications, November 26, 2012). 
Comparative Assessments 
A comparative assessment of parts within the FNC and JS CGA/PACOM IPL 
systems shows two discrepancies. First, the FNC process can be characterized as a single 
system, whereas the JS CGA/PACOM IPL process merges two distinct systems—that is, 
PROP and CGA (which includes other COCOM gap development processes)—to create a 
new system. Second, the FNC process identifies, develops, and pursues specific solutions. 
The JS CGA/IPL process does not involve specifically designated budget and other process 
parts that target solution (or product) development (K. Carlan, personal communications, 
April 11, 2012). Solution development is limited to the FCBs’ preliminary investigations on 
potential solution sets.9 A closer look at these two processes reveals a number of 
differences in underlying communication approaches. FNC supports feedback relationships 
that inform participants throughout the process and allow changes, as required. The JS 
CGA/PACOM IPL process, on the other hand, has limited feedback, generally in the form of 
a briefing to stakeholders about final Joint gaps, with limited opportunity for follow-on 
changes. In the case of the JS CGA/ PACOM IPL process this communication approach has 
three implications: (1) It degrades efforts to maintain continuity of effort and intent from 
PACOM Commander through the final JS outcome, (2) stakeholders may have limited 
opportunity to influence outcomes and may not fully understand reasoning behind final 
decisions, and (3) the ability of the process to self-correct based on process outcomes is 
limited.  
Key Insights 
Some of the important consequences of these differences are listed here: 
 The JS CGA/PACOM IPL process combines multiple systems and 
stakeholders, creating a potential for operational strife and inefficiencies. 
Achieving process integration and cohesiveness requires ongoing, two-way 
communication, which, currently, is limited.  
                                                
9 The COCOMs list known On Going Efforts (OGE) and recommended actions/solution, and the FCBs 
request Service input to review and comment on COCOM input and provide their own input. 
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 FNC solution investigations are more rigorous than those in the JS 
CGA/PACOM IPL process due to follow-on pursuit of product development. 
 Current communication relationships between PACOM, JS, and, ultimately, 
Services may lead to different (perhaps conflicting) 
understandings/expectations amongst stakeholders. 
 In the JS CGA/ IPL process, current procedures for reporting on solution 
status may curb shared understanding of how individual COCOM gaps will be 
resolved. 
Triplet 3: Structure, Function, Process 
Navy’s FNC Process 
The intended outcome of the FNC process is to identify and validate an annual list of 
operational capability gaps and to develop solutions that can be transitioned to a program of 
record. There are five primary organizational structures that participate in the process: nine 
IPTs, which are organized along nine FNC pillars; the TOG; a Resource Sponsor; Program 
Executive Office Systems Command (PEO/SYSCOM); and S&T (Office of Naval Research, 
2012).  Their configuration and participation is determined according to long-standing FNC 
procedures and practices.  Each organization performs a unique set of roles and 
responsibilities, producing well-defined information and capability solution deliverables. 
The FNC process involves seven functions performed by the aforementioned 
organizations in the following manner, as explained during FNC training (Office of Naval 
Research, 2012):  Subsequent to the review of operational problems, the nine IPTs develop 
and forward their top three non-prioritized S&T gaps to the TOG.  The TOG reviews and 
approves the S&T gaps and forwards them to OPNAV. OPNAV officially promulgates and 
issues the gaps to ONR for development and prioritization of ECs.  EC proposals are 
developed through collaborative discussions with applicable IPTs.  Furthermore, Technology 
Transition Agreements (TTAs), which serve as integral components of the ECs, are 
developed by EC project managers. The ECs are then forwarded to the IPTs for overall 
prioritization.  The prioritized ECs are reviewed and consolidated by the TOG Working 
Group and provided to the TOG for approval.  The TOG forwards the ECs to the S&T 
Sponsor who then submits the approved ECs as the Sponsor Program Proposal (SPP) to 
the Chief of Naval Research for implementation through 6.2 and 6.3 S&T projects.  
Oversight and review is performed on an ongoing basis through TOG and IPT meetings as 
well as EC project execution, product development, and the tracking of transition to POR 
and to the warfighter. 
Joint Staff CGA/PACOM IPL Process 
The primary intended outcome of the JS CGA/PACOM IPL process is to identify, 
prioritize, and validate an annual prioritized list of operational capability gaps.  It is 
distributed amongst multiple stakeholders who own different stages of the process.  The six 
primary stakeholders of the process are the PACOM PROP components, PACOM 
Commander, Joint Staff J-8, FCBs, JCB, and JROC.  They are configured and linked 
according to long-standing Joint Staff and PACOM practices.  These organizations operate 
in a sequential, and at times, interdependent manner to annually assess COCOM capability 
gaps along with a preliminary review of solutions.  Each organization performs a unique set 
of roles and responsibilities, which can contribute at times to fragmentation between Joint 
Staff and PACOM stakeholders. 
Seven IPL functions are performed by these organizations in the following manner 
(as confirmed in personal communications; K. Carlan, personal communication, April 11, 
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2012): The PACOM PROP organizations, which include USF-J, USFK, USARPAC, 
PACFLT, MARFORPAC, PACAF, SOCPAC, JIATF-West, JPAC, and ALCOM, identify, 
organize and prioritize their organization’s operational capability gaps and shortfalls.  
Operational officers have responsibility to present and convey their organization’s 
warfighting needs through collaborative data entry and dialogue.  Commander’s guidance, 
Defense Readiness Review System (DRRS) deficiencies, mission and associated 
operational context, operational requirements, and available technology are all examples of 
informational inputs to the PROP.  PACOM J-8 facilitates PROP and performs joint analysis 
across COCOM missions and operations.  It leads the formulation, development, and 
coordination of the PACOM IPL. Utilizing PROP data along with other current efforts (e.g., 
Issue Nominations, DDRS deficiencies, rebalance initiatives), PACOM J-8 prepares and 
submits the recommended IPL to PACOM key O-6 level staff officers, J-Code Directors, and 
the PACOM Deputy Commander for review, and incorporates feedback in preparation for 
submission to the PACOM Commander.  The IPL is submitted to the PACOM Commander 
for comment and approval.  The approved IPL is submitted to Joint Staff J-8 through the 
Comprehensive Joint Assessment (CJA).  The JS J-8 is responsible for conducting the 
annual capability gap assessment, which is guided by national military strategy, and 
informed by IPLs and other warfighting operational needs. The IPL capability gaps are 
further defined, taking into account similarities and differences across the COCOMs, thereby 
creating a greater overall number of gaps beyond the top 90 submitted by the nine 
COCOMs.  J-8 selectively distributes the capability gaps to the nine FCBs for review. The 
FCBs are responsible for assessing and confirming the relevance of the capability gaps and 
identifying preliminary capability solutions, if known and available.  The FCBs facilitate 
collaborative information exchange across the Services, OSD, non-Service organizations, 
and COCOMs.  FCB results are conveyed to the J-8 through purple slides and quad charts.  
The JS J-8 develops the recommended list of prioritized capability gaps for review by the 
JCB.  The JCB reviews and establishes the recommended prioritized list of capability gaps 
with programmatic recommendations and associated military and strategic risk, and submits 
them to the JROC.  The JROC validates the capability gaps for the DoD, and publishes a 
JROCM CGA, which is then distributed to the USD(AT&L) and Services for capability 
solutions acquisition and transition to the COCOMs. 
Comparative Assessment 
Both the FNC and JS CGA/PACOM IPL processes are driven by a number of 
informational inputs such as warfighting requirements and operational plans. The processes 
vary in their final outcomes, whereby technology transition to programs of record is the 
tracked and measured outcome of the FNC process while validated DoD capability gaps are 
the final outcome of the JS CGA/PACOM IPL process. 
Designed for a single Service, the FNC process is a cohesive and well-integrated 
process. It is employed exclusively through the naval chain of command and the associated 
procedure. By contrast, the JS CGA/PACOM IPL process is divided along functions 
executed by the Joint Staff, and multiple COCOM and Service stakeholders, who are guided 
by varying interests, needs, and resources. As such, process accountability, traceability, and 
measures of success are inevitably different within each process.  FNC activities are 
comprehensive; FNC represents a “closed-loop” approach to the process, enabling 
measurable outcomes. In contrast, it is difficult for JS CGA/PACOM IPL stakeholders to 
quantify how many, and to what degree, gaps are resolved as a result of the JS CGA/IPL 
process. Furthermore, unlike in the FNC process, in the JS CGA/PACOM IPL process, 
PACOM capability gaps can lose specificity, be marginalized, or may be disregarded. 
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Key Insights 
Some important consequences of these differences are listed here: 
 The way COCOM gaps evolve during the JS CGA/PACOM IPL process 
results in difficulty tracking program success as capability gaps and capability 
results are difficult to connect. 
 As a solution- and product-driven process, FNC establishes a robust and 
transparent connection between gaps and solutions, which facilitates tracking 
program success. 
 The JS CGA/IPL process is designed to focus on gap development and 
validation; as such, it only tangentially addresses gap-to-solution outcomes. 
 The hard boundary between capability gap assessment and solutions may 
limit JS CGA/PACOM IPL stakeholder access to information on program 
status and results. 
Triplet 4: Inputs, Outputs, Transformations 
Navy’s FNC Process 
The FNC process is designed to respond strictly to naval gaps as guided by naval 
requirements, sources, and mission. Considering all the activities that are taking place within 
the FNC system, two different transformations are noted: “Requirements to Products” and 
“Disparate Perspectives to Collective Ownership” (Figure 4). “Requirements to Products” is 
a systems engineering transformation and, as such, is readily visible with a tangible output. 
FNC employs a full systems engineering lifecycle, creating a seamless, transparent, and 
traceable transformation from gap to capability. Transition of enabling capabilities from FNC 
is tracked from early development activities through delivery to the naval warfighter. In this 
transformation, requirements are turned into products to be transitioned to Acquisition POR. 
These products are eventually deployed to the warfighter to resolve a capability gap. 
Clearly, this transformation is critical for the mission of the FNC program and the broader 
transformation of requirements to naval capabilities. 
The second transformation of “Disparate Perspectives to Collective Ownership” 
(Figure 4) is perhaps less noticeable but very critical in making the FNC process a 
successful one. It is concerned with the evolution of attitudes and a culture of commitment 
amongst disparate stakeholders. The FNC process has institutionalized mechanisms to 
create a collaborative environment, establish clear roles and responsibilities, and reinforce a 
culture of collaboration and accountability. Collaborative participation platforms, TTAs, and 
Transition Commitment Levels (TCLs) all commit stakeholders to clearly and explicitly stated 
role assignments, transforming functional area biases of requirements/acquisition 
communities into an integrated viewpoint and a shared mission amongst distinct 
stakeholders. This collective understanding of responsibility, accountability, and ownership, 
in turn, enables the “Requirements to Products” transformation referenced previously. 
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 FNC Transformations 
Joint Staff CGA/PACOM IPL Process 
The JS CGA/PACOM IPL process is designed to consider all COCOMs’ needs/gaps, 
each serving as an input to the JS CGA process. Therefore, diverse COCOM capability 
gaps (determined by their varying missions) are considered and prioritized. 
There are three sequential transformations for gap characterization identified within 
the JS CGA/PACOM IPL process. The first transformation, “PACOM Requirements to 
PACOM Gaps,” takes place within PROP. Based on PACOM’s mission, existing capabilities, 
available technology, and lessons learned, PACOM components consider PACOM 
requirements and provide the PACOM Deputy Commander with capability shortfalls/gaps. 
During the next transformation, “PACOM capability gaps to PACOM IPL,” the PACOM 
Commander evaluates PACOM gaps and issues the final PACOM IPL. Through the third 
transformation, “PACOM IPL to JROCM CGA,” the PACOM IPL is merged with other inputs 
(e.g., other COCOM IPLs, national military strategy, etc.) to produce joint capability gaps 
that are identified and prioritized in the JROCM CGA. 
The application of this triplet to the JS CGA/PACOM IPL process brings to the fore 
the fact that out of the three transformations, PACOM controls only the first two, which 
results in the PACOM IPL. The third transformation is controlled by JS. Since this 
transformation is designed to integrate and prioritize DoD-wide capability gaps, it takes into 
account all COCOMs’ gaps when producing final capability gap descriptions.  As a result, 
PACOM’s IPL is influenced by other COCOMs’ capability gaps and their priorities. 
Comparative Assessments 
As opposed to the FNC system, which is more narrowly focused on naval-only gaps, 
the JS CGA/PACOM IPL process is designed to address DoD-wide capability needs and 
consider all COCOM capability gaps. As such, a diverse range of missions, actors, 
requirements, and procedures feeds into the JS process. 
A comparison of the FNC and JS CGA/PACOM IPL process transformations shows 
that FNC measures of success include not only gap-to-solution considerations but also 
product transition to warfighter. The JS CGA/PACOM IPL process, on the other hand, does 
not include a gap-to-solution transformation. Additionally, the JS CGA/PACOM IPL system 
does not have a formal mandated tracking mechanism linking JROCM outputs to solution 
outcomes. Another difference between the two processes is that FNC transforms functional 
area biases of the requirements/acquisition community into a shared understanding and set 
of collaborative relationships amongst stakeholders. While the JS CGA/PACOM IPL process 
does leverage working groups and IPTs as consensus building platforms, it does not have 
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formal and binding agreements for reconciling varying organizational cultures and norms 
even though it serves a more diverse set of clients and needs. 
Key Insights 
These differences have several implications for the two processes’ performances: 
 PACOM capability gap prioritization may be marginalized due to other 
COCOM higher priority capability gaps. Similarly, PACOM capability gaps 
may lose theater operational specificity when/if they are merged with other 
related COCOM capability gaps. 
 Due to the impact of multiple COCOM gaps on joint capability gaps, it is 
difficult to effectively link individual IPL inputs to joint CGA outputs. 
 There is limited ability to effectively track and measure the overall transition 
success in JS-led IPL transformation. 
 Cultural transformation in the FNC system enables agreement, shared 
ownership, and direct accountability. 
 FNC outcomes resonate with stakeholders as they produce tangible products 
as an output. 
 By nature of the JS CGA/PACOM IPL process, stakeholder definitions of 
successful transformation may vary—system transformation may be 
successful, but it does not mean all stakeholders win. 
Triplet 5: Command, Control, Communications 
Navy’s FNC Process 
Command of the FNC process is implemented through ownership and decision-
making organizations.  The S&T Corporate Board owns responsibility for the FNC program 
and establishes policy as well as the participating organizations’ roles and responsibilities.  
The nine IPTs, TOG, and Chief of Naval Research (CNR) have decision-making authorities 
for the execution of the process, production of the S&T gaps, and development and 
transitioning of the ECs and solutions to the POR for operational use.  Control of the 
process, organizational behaviors, and rules of engagement are built-in mechanisms at both 
the macro and micro levels.  DoD 5000.02 (OUSD[AT&L], 2008), naval requirements, and 
the nine FNC pillars provide overarching macro control guidance.  The TOG Charter, FNC 
business rules, TTAs (including TRLs and TCLs), project plans, staff training, and transition 
metrics are micro-level controls to manage and track performance, and support decision-
making throughout the process lifecycle.   
The FNC process promotes and facilitates formal and informal collaborative 
information sharing.  Closed-loop communications facilitate accountability and provide clear 
measurable data on outcomes.  Information flows through organized coordination and 
feedback mechanisms with mandatory participation requirements for all stakeholders.  
Scheduled IPT, TOG, and TOG working group meetings and informal information 
exchanges enable stakeholders and decision-makers to assess and track key S&T gaps 
and ECs, and transition capability solutions to the POR for operational use.  Dual-hatted IPT 
co-chairs also facilitate information sharing and general situational awareness through both 
formal and informal channels as they move between FNC and non-FNC worlds. 
Documentation of the gaps, ECs, project plans, TTAs, and transition reports are established, 
maintained, and shared across the FNC organizations. 
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Joint Staff CGA/PACOM IPL Process 
The JS CGA/PACOM IPL process is not owned or governed by a single organization 
and its stakeholders.  The JS owns responsibility for the DoD CGA process, including the 
joint capability gap assessment and the JROC validation.  PACOM is responsible for 
developing, approving, and submitting the PACOM IPL.  The JROC, JCB, JS J-8, and 
PACOM Commander, have critical decision-making power. As part of their roles and 
responsibilities, they make decisions to execute the process, and develop and validate 
capability gaps.  FCBs, FCB working groups, and PROP organizations provide prioritized 
recommendations to the process.  There are limited control mechanisms within the JS 
CGA/PACOM IPL process to facilitate whole-process integration.  Formal control is limited 
due to the absence of such aspects as standard protocols or measures of collective 
ownership and accountability.  The DoD and PACOM level controlling guidance includes 
Defense Planning and Programming Guidance (DPPG); CJCSI 8501.01A (CJCS, 2004); 
3110.01G (released in 2008); 3170.01H (CJCS, 2012); JS guidance on how to compose an 
IPL; Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES); Pacific Theater 
Strategy (first edition); and PACOM PROP Instruction (Commander, U.S. Pacific Command 
[USPACOM], 2011).  
Communications take place predominantly in the form of one-way information 
delivery.  They are performed through written as well as verbal information exchange 
mediums.  The CGA, IPL, purple slides, quad charts, and JROCM Capability Gap 
Assessment are classified documents that communicate assessed, prioritized, and validated 
capability gaps.  The JROC, JCB, FCBs and working groups, J-8 Worldwide Conference, 
and PACOM PROP serve as platforms that enable dialogue and discussions across 
operational and programmatic representatives. 
Comparative Assessment 
FNC maintains command of the full lifecycle of the process and the associated 
decision-making since the governance framework that is in place is holistic, integrated and 
owned by a single organization. The JS CGA/PACOM IPL process is, on the other hand, 
governed through multiple separate and independent command structures.  PACOM owns 
its PACOM IPL process as evidenced by the Commander’s approval and submission of the 
IPL.  Thereafter, the JS governs the process for the DoD and all COCOMs.  FNC is 
controlled by macro-level USN guidance and policies and a micro view of instructions, as 
well as roles and responsibilities.  The JS CGA/PACOM IPL process relies mainly on macro 
command level guidance driven by DoD-wide needs and demands.   
Both processes provide opportunities for collaboration and coordination.  The JS 
capability gap assessment is, nonetheless, not dependent on COCOM participation.  As 
such, COCOM capability gaps may be marginalized.  Further, COCOM participation is 
informed by real or perceived limited return on time investment.  FNC stakeholders have a 
clear understanding of the FNC lifecycle process and are provided specific updates. 
COCOMs have diverging perceptions of the process and may be provided more ambiguous 
information regarding how joint gaps evolve during the cycle and are subsequently fulfilled.  
FNC offers enhanced accountability through its complete feedback loop that closes the 
lifecycle of a gap by reporting outcomes to stakeholders. JS CGA/PACOM IPL 
communications are hindered by logistics, practical process difficulties, and, perhaps most 
importantly, the potential discrepancy between the gap assessments by COCOMs and the 
DoD. 
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Key Insights 
These differences between the two processes generate the following implications: 
 Centralized and integrated governance and participatory processes that 
characterize the FNC system provide continuity of process by allowing 
stakeholder input and agreement throughout the lifecycle of the process and 
by developing shared understanding, joint ownership, and accountability. 
 The distributed governance and one-way communications that characterize 
the JS CGA/PACOM IPL process disrupt the continuity of the process and 
provide limited opportunities for management of stakeholder perceptions and 
resulting expectations. 
 As a multi-stakeholder process, the JS CGA/PACOM IPL process may need 
formal integration mechanisms to bring different parts of the process together 
for shared ownership and enhanced accountability. 
 The absence of formal tracking of gap modification and related outcomes 
limits JS CGA/PACOM IPL process feedback and creates the potential for 
missed opportunities in adjusting/correcting performance. 
Triplet 6: Openness, Hierarchy, Emergence 
Navy FNC Process 
The FNC system presents two-way openness throughout its process lifecycle: 
exterior to interior and interior to exterior. Exterior to interior openness is evidenced by the 
system’s ability to accept evolving naval requirements/gaps, advances/availabilities of 
technology, new S&T developers, and transition venues/methods. The FNC process is also 
responsive to data on transition to the warfighter. Interior to exterior openness is presented 
by the dual-hatted FNC players’ ability to cross into non-FNC domains. 
There is some evidence of re-configurability of system hierarchy.  For example, “the 
FNC pillars were reduced from 11 to 5 in 2004” (Goldstein, 2006). Similarly, in 2005 the FNC 
system “was restructured to align with the pillars of the Chief of Naval Operations’ and the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps’ vision for the future—Naval Power 21—and to focus on 
providing Enabling Capabilities to close warfighting gaps” (Office of Naval Research, n.d.-
b).10 
The FNC system accommodates changing circumstances and new process parts; it 
allows itself to be open to emergent system properties. For example, the transition data 
influence subsequent FNC processes and performance, which facilitate resource-efficient 
management of FNC as it permits revision of the process and adjustments in performance 
based on transition statistics. 
Joint Staff CGA/ PACOM IPL Process 
The JS CGA/PACOM IPL process is quasi-open and presents mostly one-way 
openness. Exterior to interior openness of the JS CGA/PACOM IPL process can be seen in 
its acceptance of evolving requirements and gaps. However, the process is closed to 
stakeholder feedback subsequent to the issuance of the JROCM. Interior to exterior 
openness is evidenced by the interior stakeholder communications with the exterior 
stakeholders. 
                                                
10 This quote can be found on the Office of Naval Research website as cached by December 9, 2012. 
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The JS CGA/PACOM IPL process has limited options for change as the 
configuration of system elements appears stable. As a result of limited re-configurability, the 
system is less versatile and is at risk of critique and perception of ineffectiveness by 
stakeholders. 
Comparative Assessments 
Both FNC and JS CGA/PACOM IPL processes present openness, but the JS 
CGA/PACOM IPL process’ openness terminates subsequent to the JROCM conveyance. 
Another critical distinction between the two processes is concerned with tracking of 
transition data. The FNC process is responsive to data on transition to the acquisition POR 
and eventual deployment of the S&T product or capability to the fleet. The JS CGA/PACOM 
IPL process tracks CGA gaps (i.e., COCOM gaps that are accepted as joint gaps), but does 
not formally track other aspects of the process (i.e., COCOM gap modification and matching 
of outcome to original COCOM gap). 
Key Insights 
Some of the critical consequences that emerge out of the previous discussion 
include the following: 
 Given there is not a mandated feedback system nor a comprehensive 
transition tracking system in the JS CGA/PACOM IPL process, stakeholders 
may pursue what they see as unfilled capability gaps through other means 
such as JCTDs and JUONS, leading to a potential duplication of efforts and 
inefficient use of resources. 
 The FNC process leverages transition data to modify subsequent FNC 
process and performance. This may result in a more resource-efficient 
management of the process. 
Triplet 7: Variety, Harmony, Parsimony11 
Navy’s FNC Process 
The FNC process introduces an instance of harmony in the way it deals with the 
tracking of S&T products and their delivery to the naval warfighter. To achieve harmony, the 
FNC process tracks two important transitions. First, the process tracks the transition of S&T 
products to the intended acquisition POR (Office of Naval Research, 2012). As noted in the 
boundaries discussion, this transition is an immediate output of the FNC process, and is 
therefore tracked as a critical success metric. Even so, tracking FNC product transition to 
the POR does not necessarily provide a complete and accurate assessment of product 
delivery to the warfighter. For example, the POR itself may never transition to the warfighter 
due to a number of factors, including program cancellation. Similarly, transitioning products 
to a POR is not an end in itself; rather it serves a broader purpose. In this regard, tracking 
only transition to the POR runs the risk of creating a false sense of S&T integration success 
and is, therefore, too parsimonious of a view. To counter this, FNC leverages variety in 
transition statistics. In addition to tracking transition to the POR, the FNC program tracks 
POR transition to the warfighter (Office of Naval Research, 2012). Just as tracking the 
transition of products to the POR risks creating a false sense of success, tracking only 
transition of PORs to the warfighter runs the risk of creating an inaccurate assessment of 
                                                
11 The triplet of variety, harmony and parsimony is probably the most abstract Conceptagon triplet of 
all. Rather than identifying every instance of variety and every instance of parsimony, the study team 
sought to identify instances of harmony, as these were believed to indicate practices that enhanced 
system performance. 
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S&T product failure. This is primarily because S&T products are but one of many factors in 
determining a POR’s successful transition. It is the balance of viewing success of direct 
outputs of the FNC process (S&T product transition to POR) through the lens of broader 
naval capability delivery (how and if those products are ultimately used by the warfighter) 
that brings harmony to the FNC program assessments. 
Joint Staff CGA/PACOM IPL Process 
By nature of its service to multiple stakeholders across all COCOMs, the JS 
CGA/PACOM IPL process is subject to great variety. An instance of variety is found in the 
number of number-one priority gaps submitted to the Joint Staff. Herein COCOMs submit 
their top gaps (through each COCOM’s IPL) to the Joint Staff (later forwarded to the JROC) 
for inclusion in the final CGA. Individual COCOM gaps are ranked in priority order preceding 
submission to the JS J-8. This process is conducive to producing much variety in the 
number of incoming number-one priority gaps, as all nine COCOMs submit a gap 
designated as number-one. The JS J-8 receives the ranked gaps from each of the COCOMs 
and then works to combine them into a new, consolidated list of prioritized gaps. This 
consolidation is done so that the DoD can work from a single list of prioritized defense gaps. 
The process is also used to reduce duplication of gaps and to combine similar gaps.  The JS 
J-8 list is then forwarded through the FCBs and JCB, wherein each group reviews and 
reorganizes (as required) the list of prioritized gaps prior to final review and approval by the 
JROC. The passing of the list through many review boards also introduces variety in the 
process. 
Although the processes of combining, accepting, rejecting, realigning, and 
reorganizing COCOM gaps into a single finalized list of joint capability gaps does introduce 
parsimony (in the creation of a consolidated list), it does not necessarily bring about 
harmony. By requesting a ranked list of gaps from individual COCOMs, the process 
inadvertently sets an expectation that the number-one gaps should all receive top priority in 
the final list. However this may not be the case as one COCOM’s top ten needs may make 
the final list while another COCOM may not see any of its submitted gaps reflected in the 
final CGA.  Furthermore, the process of homogenizing many seemingly similar gaps into one 
broad gap statement may create a gap so broad that eventual solutions fail to meet the 
original need of the submitting COCOM(s).  Additionally, variety in the number of reviews as 
well as groups responsible for approving the CGA fragments the ownership process. 
Comparative Assessment 
Both FNC and the Joint Staff processes accept gap statements from various groups 
(IPTs and COCOMs, respectively); however, by consolidating and reprioritizing COCOM-
submitted number-one needs, the Joint Staff process may result in stakeholder frustration. 
The FNC process benefits from a more direct coordination process as opposed to the Joint 
Staff process where gaps must travel through many working groups and boards. With each 
change of hands in the Joint Staff process, gaps are further homogenized, refined, and 
altered.  This extended process of shaping capability gaps can result in gaps that, in some 
cases, only marginally reflect the originally submitted COCOM need.  
Key Insights 
There are two major consequences and their associated ripple effects resulting from 
these instances of variety, harmony, and parsimony: 
 The FNC process achieves harmony at multiple stages of the process 
through its organizational structure and continuous planning for final transition 
to the warfighter. 
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 Fragmentation of reviewers (through the JS process) and homogenization of 
COCOM IPLs into joint capability gaps may cause discord leading to general 
solutions that do not effectively satisfy specific COCOM needs; difficulty in 
identifying and tracking original COCOM gaps; and COCOMs’ resubmission 
of the same gaps in subsequent years. 
Conclusions, Recommendations, and Strategies for Improvements 
Admittedly, endstates of the two systems (the naval FNC process and the JS 
CGA/PACOM IPL process) are markedly different; FNC is a gap-to-solution process 
(including both gap and solution development phases) whereas the JS CGA/ PACOM IPL 
process is solely a gap development process. In addition to varying endstates, the systems 
differ in the breadth of customers they serve. FNC, a naval program serving naval 
warfighters, is united by purpose, mission, Service, and ownership—in other words, it is an 
end-to-end by Navy/for Navy process. On the other hand, the JS process serves multiple 
customers (e.g., COCOMs, Services). As such, while individual COCOM IPL development 
processes may be united by mission (though not Service), the final disposition of CGA will 
be subject to a variety of needs across different missions and purposes.  
Bearing these differences in mind—particularly as related to varying endstates—we 
focused our comparison on steps in both processes that lead to a common milestone of 
final, prioritized gaps. In the course of the comparison, it became evident that FNC’s 
integration of the solution phase better positions the FNC process to leverage inherent 
feedbacks between the two phases, thereby enhancing its responsiveness to naval needs. 
Although solution development activities will remain with the Services, our analysis indicates 
the JS CGA/PACOM IPL process may benefit from strategies employed by the FNC 
program such as communication and comprehensive gap-to-solution tracking strategies. 
The team further believes the following recommendations may serve to mitigate some of the 
frustrations experienced by stakeholders in the JS CGA/PACOM IPL process.  
 The JS CGA/PACOM IPL process could expand its boundary to include 
solution providers. Existing structures (e.g., FCBs, supporting working 
groups) can be used to facilitate formal participation by the acquisition 
community.   
 The JS could improve transparency relative to gap status. Formal, 
accountable, ongoing and two-way communication will facilitate 
understanding, expectation management, and feedback. 
 Gap and solution progress statistics, collected in coordination with the 
acquisition and warfighter communities (currently partially tracked by the JS 
and accessible through KMDS), could be documented and published 
periodically (e.g., annually or bi-annually) and could be actively disseminated 
to COCOMs and briefed at FCBs and JCBs.  
 The JS and PACOM should leverage tracking metrics (as recommended 
above) to inform process improvement efforts. The JS process should 
establish procedures and better define roles and responsibilities to encourage 
metric and process accountability.   
  The JS can improve stakeholder satisfaction and commitment by 
promulgating process steps and clarifying guidance documents. The JS 
should update related Instructions and should consider developing user 
friendly products and reports that explain the process.  
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